NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, District Judge.
This civil action matter arises out of the tragic death of Laporshia Massey ("Laporshia" or "Decedent") on September 25, 2013, which was allegedly caused by an untreated asthma attack that occurred at school. Presently, before this Court are the following pleadings: (1) a motion to dismiss filed by the School District of Philadelphia ("District"), W.C. Bryant Promise Academy ("Bryant Academy"), and Principal Gaddy (collectively "Defendants") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6), [ECF 12], which seeks to dismiss the amended complaint filed by Pauline Hodges and Mark W. Richardson, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Laporshia Massey, ("Plaintiff"), [ECF 7]; and (2) Plaintiff's opposition. [ECF 13]. The issues in the motion to dismiss have been fully briefed by the parties and are ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, in part, and denied, in part.
When ruling on the motion to dismiss, this Court must accept, as true, all relevant and pertinent factual allegations in Plaintiff's amended complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir.2009). In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts:
On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, City of Philadelphia ("City"), and Teacher Doe,
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. The court must determine "whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a `plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The complaint must do more than merely allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief; it must "show such an entitlement with its facts." Id. (citations omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not `show[n]'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)) (alterations in original). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts (1) federal claims under § 1983 against all Defendants for violations of Decedent's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights, a Monell claim against the District and Bryant Academy, and a supervisory claim against Principal Gaddy; and (2) state law tort claims against all Defendants. In their motion, Defendants move to dismiss these claims. This Court will address each claim separately.
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a remedy for a violation of the United States Constitution and/or laws of the United States. Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165-66 (3d Cir.2013). That is, § 1983 does not provide substantive rights but, instead, "provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws." M.U. v. Downingtown High Sch. E., 103 F.Supp.3d 612, 619-20, 2015 WL 1893264, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 27, 2015) (quoting Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.1996)). Specifically, § 1983 provides:
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to assert a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under the color of state law violated a right secured by the Constitution and/or laws of the United States. Morrow, 719 F.3d at 165-66.
Here, Plaintiff asserts Defendants violated Laporshia's constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. For purposes of the § 1983 claims, it is undisputed that a public school district and its employees, including the school principal, are state actors. See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 982 F.Supp.2d 462, 477 (E.D.Pa.2013); K.S. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 2007 WL 1009815, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 28, 2007); Mohammed v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 355 F.Supp.2d 779, 782 (E.D.Pa.2005). Thus, Defendants' alleged conduct will be reviewed.
Plaintiff claims that Laporshia was subjected to an illegal seizure in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful search and seizures conducted by state officials. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009). Generally, the Fourth Amendment rights extend to public school students. Safford, 557 U.S. at 370, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (analyzing plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
While this Court has not been able to find any precedent specifically addressing an illegal seizure involving an asthmatic student, other cases in this circuit addressing the seizure of public school students, albeit in different contexts, offer guidance. For example, in Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor School District, where a student was investigated for sexual misconduct, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals established a two-prong analysis of claims of unlawful search and seizure in the public school setting under the Fourth Amendment; to wit: first, there must have been a seizure and, second, the seizure must have been unreasonable under the circumstances. 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.2005).
The element of seizure is met when (1) "a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave," Shuman, 422 F.3d at 147 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)), and (2) the seizure was intentional. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (stating that [a] "Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement ... but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.") (emphasis in the original); see also K.M. v. Chichester Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 568553, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 10, 2015) (holding that the plaintiff failed to allege illegal seizure because plaintiff failed to allege facts that allowed inference of an intentional seizure).
The determination of the second prong—reasonableness under the circumstances—balances public and private considerations relevant in a school setting. Specifically, the analysis balances "special consideration to the goals and responsibilities of [] public schools," Shuman, 422 F.3d at 149, and the students' interest in privacy. Valentino v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 2003 WL 177210, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 23, 2003); see also Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir.2001) (recognizing that schools are in a unique position regarding students' constitutional rights because they maintain control of students; "students' movement and location are subject to the ordering and direction of teachers and administrators.") (citations omitted).
Here, in the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Laporshia "was kept at school, despite her having told Defendants that she could not breath[e]" and that Defendants did "not permit[] Laporshia [] to leave school to obtain medical care"
Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment alleging the deprivation of Laporshia's liberty and life.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. While courts recognize that the due process clause protects against the State's own violation of individual constitutional rights, the clause is "not a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security" and imposes no affirmative duty on municipal entities to protect citizens from harm that may "come ... through other means." DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). In DeShaney, the United States Supreme Court noted that the Constitution confers "no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." 489 U.S. at 196, 109 S.Ct. 998. The Court further stated, "[i]f the Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them." Id. at 197, 109 S.Ct. 998. The Third Circuit has interpreted DeShaney as "stand[ing] for the harsh proposition that even though state officials know that a person is in imminent danger of harm from another source, the Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon those state officials no obligation to prevent that harm." Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 457 (3d Cir.1989); see also Morrow, 719 F.3d at 166 (stating, as "a general matter ... a State's failure to protect an individual ... simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause") (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197, 109 S.Ct. 998).
Accordingly, this Court finds that although Defendants had no constitutional obligation to prevent an injury resulting from an asthma attack, the analysis of whether a violation occurred is not concluded. As an exception to the general principle that a state does not have an affirmative duty to protect a student from harm, a state may be held liable for injury when the state (1) entered into a "special relationship" with the plaintiff, or (2) created a danger which resulted in foreseeable injury to a discrete plaintiff. See Morrow, 719 F.3d at 167; Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1205. This Court will analyze whether either of the two exceptions applies to Plaintiff's claims.
While government entities generally do not have a constitutional obligation to protect citizens from harm, the Constitution
Courts in the Third Circuit have held that publicly funded schools do not have a special relationship with their students that would create an affirmative duty to protect the students from harm. See Brown v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 456 Fed.Appx. 88, 90 n. 5 (3d Cir.2011) (noting the existence of the special relationship exception, but stating "a student does not have that relationship with the state"); Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 304 n. 4 (3d Cir.2006) (discussing D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vo. Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir.1992) (holding that no special relationship exists because school children "remain residents in their homes" and can leave during the school day)).
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff has not pled any facts to distinguish this case from established precedent that a public school does not have a special relationship with its minor children sufficient to create a constitutional duty to protect those students from harmful acts encountered at school. Therefore, this Court finds that no special relationship existed between Decedent and Defendants.
In Kneipp, the Third Circuit adopted the doctrine of "state-created danger" to hold state actors liable under § 1983. Specifically, the Court held that to assert a viable § 1983 claim under the "state-created danger" exception, a plaintiff must allege facts to support each of the following elements: (1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the defendant acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) there existed some relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of defendant's acts or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought by the defendant's actions; and (4) the defendant used its authority to create a danger to the plaintiff or that rendered the plaintiff more vulnerable to danger than had the defendant not acted at all. 95 F.3d at 1205; see also Brown, 456 Fed.Appx. at 91.
In general terms, Defendants argue that the facts alleged in the amended complaint fail to satisfy any of the elements of the state-created danger theory except for the fourth element of a state-created danger claim, i.e., whether Defendants affirmatively created a danger to Laporshia or rendered her more vulnerable to danger than had Defendants not acted at all. Although not each element was elaborated on, this Court will address each of the four elements of the state-created danger exception ad seriatim.
As to the second element of a state-created danger claim, Plaintiff contends that Teacher Doe and Defendants acted with such a degree of culpability as to shock the conscience.
As stated, Plaintiff alleges that "`Decedent had been diagnosed with asthma, which is a medical condition that requires immediate intervention such that any delay can lead to death in a matter of moments."
With regard to the third element of a state-created danger claim, a plaintiff must allege facts to show that there existed some relationship between the defendant and plaintiff such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of defendant's acts or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought by Defendant's actions. Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1205. "Under the state-created danger basis for alleging a constitutional violation, the relationship requirement `contemplates some contact such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts in a tort sense.'" Gremo v. Karlin, 363 F.Supp.2d 771, 789 (E.D.Pa.2005) (quoting Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1209 n. 22). That is, the plaintiff cannot be alleged to be a foreseeable victim "if the state actors create[d] a threat to the general population only...." Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 913 (3d Cir.1997).
Here, the relationship is clear; to wit: Laporshia was a six grade student at Bryant Academy. Defendants knew Laporshia was an asthmatic student and had "actual and/or constructive knowledge of the risks to asthma patients," namely, the risk that an asthma attack could lead to death if not immediately treated.
Lastly, to establish the fourth element of a state-created danger claim, Plaintiff must state facts to show that (1) Defendants exercised their authority, (2) took an affirmative action, and (3) that the action taken created a danger to Laporshia or rendered her more vulnerable to danger than had Defendants not acted at all. Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 639 (3d Cir.2007). "Liability under the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the states' affirmative acts," D.R., 972 F.2d at 1374, which directly caused the Decedent's injury. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 432 (3d Cir.2006) (stating that "the fourth element is satisfied where the state's action was the `but for cause' of the danger faced by the plaintiff."). "[It] is [the] misuse of state authority, rather than a failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause." Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir.2006). Thus, in order to successfully plead the fourth element of a state-created danger claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege facts showing that an affirmative act was performed by a state actor and directed at the plaintiff. See, e.g., Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1202-09 (holding police officers had "used their authority as ... officers to create a
Though surprisingly not mentioned in either party's brief, this Court finds instructive the matter of Taylor v. Altoona Area School District, 513 F.Supp.2d 540 (W.D.Pa.2007), a case which also involves a student who suffered an asthma attack at school and tragically died. Id. at 548. There, despite the teacher's concrete knowledge of prior asthma attacks, hospitalization due to those attacks, and serious risk of great harm to the student if asthma complications were not addressed properly, the teacher still "refused" to allow the student to contact his mother or the school nurse to "receive direct and/or immediate attention for the symptoms and deteriorating condition," despite the fact that contacting such individuals was part of the school's plan to help manage the student's asthma while at school. Taylor, 513 F.Supp.2d at 545. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court there construed the plaintiff's allegations to successfully plead the fourth element because the teacher "affirmatively prevented [the student] from seeking medical attention that he would have otherwise sought on his own," acting in direct contrast to the school's medical protocol established to manage the student's asthma attacks. Taylor, 513 F.Supp.2d at 548, 573 (emphasis in original).
Likewise, here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted affirmatively to the detriment of Laporshia (1) by maintaining a policy and/or custom of not having a nurse on duty and not permitting students to use prescription medication without a nurse on duty,
Defendants argue that the claims against Principal Gaddy should be dismissed based upon the defense of qualified immunity. Though Defendants have provided the legal standard for qualified immunity, they fail to make any arguments as to its application, and only cursorily and vaguely state that "Principal Gaddy is entitled to immunity on every basis made available by Carswell's decision tree."
As set forth above, this Court has found that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged constitutional violations of Laporshia's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because the Third Circuit has clearly held that the burden of pleading the defense of qualified immunity falls on the defendant, Defendants have not yet met their burden to sufficiently plead qualified immunity, and Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged constitutional violations, this Court finds it inappropriate to decide the issue of qualified immunity at this stage of litigation. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds is denied. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299 (3d Cir.2000) (holding that "[t]he evaluation of a qualified immunity defense is appropriate for summary judgment because the court's inquiry is primarily legal: whether the legal norms the defendant's conduct allegedly violated were clearly established.").
Defendants also contend that the supervisory liability claim against Principal Gaddy should be dismissed because there are no factual allegations as to Principal Gaddy's personal involvement or acquiescence to the events. Plaintiff sued Principal Gaddy both in her official and individual capacities for supervisory liability, claiming that Principal Gaddy was (1) a policymaker who participated in promulgating the policy and/or custom that led to Decedent's constitutional harm, and (2) a supervisor who "directed and/or acquiesced to the [unconstitutional] conduct of those over whom she exercised supervisory authority."
In a supervisory liability claim, a "[g]overnment official[] may not be held liable for unconstitutional conduct of [a] subordinate[] under a theory of respondeat superior." Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 71 (3d Cir.2011). Likewise, it is "well established that a defendant in a civil rights case cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved [of]." C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201 (3d
Personal involvement can be alleged under either one of the two theories. First, an individual defendant may be alleged to be a policymaker who, "with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained [a] policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm." A.M. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.2004) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir.1989)). Second, an official may be held liable under supervisory liability, if "he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations." Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 125 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting A.M., 372 F.3d at 586).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege any personal involvement or acquiescence on the part of Principal Gaddy, and has not met the elements required under the second theory.
As analyzed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the circumstances of September 25, 2013, and that Defendants' alleged conduct led to a violation of Laporshia's constitutional rights under the state-created danger exception. In addition, Plaintiff contends that "[a]t all relevant times Defendant Principal Gaddy was aware of her subordinates' taking ... action and directed them to take such conduct and/or acquiesced to their conduct."
Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim against Defendant District for its alleged constitutional violations of Laporshia's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments rights. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant District established a policy and/or custom that led to the illegal seizure and state-created danger and deprivation of Laporshia's rights to liberty and life.
As to the issue of the unconstitutionality of the policy and/or custom, a governmental entity, such as a public school or school district, may not be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations caused by its employees or agents based solely on the principle of respondeat superior. Monell, 463 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Rather, liability exists for a municipality for its "deliberate conduct" only when the municipality "was the `moving force behind the injury alleged.'" Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); see also Daniels, 982 F.Supp.2d at 477 (holding that a municipality's "policy or practice must be the `moving force' behind the constitutional violation.'"). Thus, liability may be imposed on a public entity only when its official policy and/or custom causes an employee to violate another person's constitutional rights. See Brown, 456 Fed.Appx. at 90 ("For the School District itself to be liable, `any injury must be inflicted by execution of [its] policy or custom.'") (citing Santiago, 629 F.3d at 135).
As set forth by the Third Circuit Court:
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir.1990).
In either instance, "a plaintiff must show that an official who has the power to make policy is responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of policy or [an] acquiescence in a well-settled custom." Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir.1990); see also Santiago, 629 F.3d at 135 n. 11 ("While ... whether [a supervisor] is a final policymaker is ultimately a legal rather than a factual question, [] that does not relieve [plaintiff] of the obligation to plead in some fashion that [the supervisor] had final policy making authority, as that is a key element of a Monell claim."). Additionally, at the pleading stage, a claimant "must identify a custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was." McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir.2009).
Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts to meet all elements of a Monell claim. First, Plaintiff has pled "in some fashion, that [an official] had final policy making authority." Santiago, 629 F.3d at
In Counts V and VI, Plaintiff asserts wrongful death and survival action claims against Defendants. Defendants contend that both claims should be dismissed against the District and Principal Gaddy because they are immune to suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("Tort Claims Act"), 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501 et seq. (2001). Specifically, Defendants argue that the Tort Claims Act bars suit against the District because it is a local agency, and against Principal Gaddy, who is an employee of the School District.
The Tort Claims Act grants immunity to local agencies and provides that "no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property" unless the injury was "caused by the negligent acts of the local agency" and the negligence falls within one of its eight enumerated exceptions.
Thus, a local agency or its employee that engages in willful misconduct cannot claim immunity under the Tort Claims Act. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8542(a), 8550; see also R.H.S. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep't of Human Serv., 936 A.2d 1218, 1230 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2007) (holding that immunity under the "Tort Claims Act [] does not apply where it is judicially determined that the act of the employee or agency causing the injury constituted a crime, actual fraud, malice or willful misconduct.")
Under the Tort Claims Act, willful misconduct is synonymous to an intentional tort. R.H.S., 936 A.2d at 1230. That is, the actor "desired to bring about the result that followed, or at least [] he was aware that it was substantially certain to ensue." Id. (citing Evans v. Phila. Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440, 443 (1965)); Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1022 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2014) (holding that "willful misconduct occurs when the actor `desired to bring about the result that followed, or at least that he was aware that it was substantially certain to ensue.'") (quoting R.H.S., 936 A.2d at 1230).
While the present case clearly does not fall within one of the eight exceptions delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled Defendants' willful misconduct such that Defendants' argument for immunity under the Tort Claims Act cannot be raised at this time. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' conduct was "unreasonably, recklessly, willfully, and deliberately indifferent to the health, safety, and well-being of Laporshia Massey."
Defendant Bryant Academy argues that the claims against it should be dismissed since it is not a legal entity separate from the School District. This Court agrees.
In addition, Bryant Academy seeks the dismissal of the Monell claims asserted against it since Plaintiff has failed to allege that Bryant Academy is a municipal entity. This Court again agrees and will dismiss Plaintiff's Monell claim against Bryant Academy. See, e.g., Allen v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 2006 WL 1997373, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 12, 2006) (noting that a school is not a municipality held liable under Monell because "the holding in Monell is limited to `local government units not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.'") (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2018).
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, in part, and denied, in part. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows.
1) all claims against Bryant Academy are
2) Defendants' motion to dismiss is
